I've been doing Dolphins draft recaps for years and years, and one constant over the years (besides almost unfathomably bad drafts) is [insert-failed-GM's-name-here] swearing up and down that Miami was true to its board, taking the best player available throughout. But this year more than any in memory, there was no denying (even though the team will try to) that Miami elected to draft by need vs. BPA, which in the best scenario leads to short-term results at the potential expense of long-term excellence.
Indeed, the 'Fins' first four picks should assume sizeable roles in Miami early in their careers, with rover Minkah Fitzpatrick and tight end Mike Gesicki getting every opportunity to be game-changers. With their own career prospects riding on this draft, general manager Mike Tannenbaum and (to a lesser extent) coach Adam Gase took the personally prudent and easy way out by filling the most glaring holes in order of priority.
All that being said, down the road this draft (like many others) is likely to be judged on who Miami didn't draft -- specifically, Josh Rosen, and generally, any quarterback whatsoever. Also, in an offseason that saw Ndamokong Suh jettisoned and the enigmatic Jordan Phillips enter a contract year, the Dolphins didn't take a defensive tackle, either.
While you can (and Miami did) grab a veteran DT to plug and play, it's odd to me that a self-styled "quarterback guru" hasn't made any moves designed to arm him with a young prospect that he can mold to take over his offense. The Dolphins have moved heaven and earth to give Gase every possible avenue to stocking the offensive personnel he wants, bending over backward to move players in and out for an offense that was allegedly designed to succeed on scheme over personnel. And even though I don't consider myself a Ryan Tannehill "hater" (he's a middle-of-the-road NFL signal-caller), I certainly wouldn't want to be hitching my professional wagon to him to the extent that Miami's front office has.
Set against this questionable strategy are a number of other questions about the 'Fins' offseason to date and beyond: Does this draft class fit the newfound emphasis on culture? To that end, is culture just an excuse used by an overwhelmed and outmatched coaching staff? Has Gase been sufficiently humbled by a rocky 2017 or will his ego continue to be a barrier to improvement? How much will this offseason impact the future of the uneasy alliance of Tannenbaum, Gase, and general manager Chris Grier?
Against that backdrop, here's what the 'Fins came up with in the 2018 NFL Draft ...
1st round, 11th Overall: Minkah Fitzpatrick, S, Alabama
I have no doubt that Fitzpatrick is a fine player who will give Miami schematic versatility in the back seven. However, in what will become a theme throughout this analysis, poor roster management helped drive this pick, which is never ideal. The Dolphins have one of the league's top (and highest-paid) safeties in Reshad Jones, but they compromised that fact by inexplicably giving an on-suspension T.J. MacDonald a hefty contract extension in training camp last year. After MacDonald served his half-season suspension and began playing, it dawned on the coaching staff (which has been dramatically overhauled and seemingly ridden of cokeheads) that Jones and MacDonald were too similar in playing styles and unable to communicate well. In an effort to resolve that issue, Miami decided to take a 'tweener defensive back in Fitzpatrick, with the hope that his positional flexibility offsets the safety redundancy that has been created. I have concerns about taking a player at 11th overall who is a positional projection, on top of the idea that Alabama players usually come to the pros physically spent and without much room too grow. Again, I don't have too many issues with the player, but in the context of the moves that precipitated his necessity and who was still on the board (Rosen), he's going to have to be a big-time contributor early on to win over many observers.
2nd round, 42nd Overall: Mike Gesicki, TE, Penn State
The Dolphins had their pick of tight ends with the 10th pick in the second round, and they opted (somewhat surprisingly) for Gesicki. There is no question that Miami had a glaring need at the position, and by all accounts, Gesicki is an athletic mismatch who can challenge the seams and give the 'Fins a needed red zone weapon. However, many scouting reports led with the observation that he can't block his way out of a paperbag (apologies to Rob Konrad and Bryan Cox), meaning that Miami took a one-dimensional player, which always has repercussions (more on that later). If Gesicki catches 50 balls and turns into a viable scoring weapon, all is forgotten; however, if he's a liability in the running game, has difficulty getting off the line, and makes the offense more predictable, this braintrust gets no excuses.
3rd Round, 73rd Overall: Jerome Baker, OLB, Ohio State
Tannenbaum, Gase, & Co. doubled down on one-dimensional players by reaching for Baker, a player whose performance declined when he wasn't paired with another NFL-caliber player in once and future teammate Raquan McMillan. Like Gesicki, Baker is a measurables athlete with a major strength (pass coverage) and a major deficiency (run leverage). There was serious talent on the board at a variety of positions when Baker was taken, and a number of observers were surprised that he went in this spot. From a need standpoint, Baker fits the bill; the hope is he can find his rhythm alongside McMillan, shore up the 'Fins' woeful second-line coverage, and demonstrate that he's a three-down 'backer. However, his addition means that Miami came out of the draft's first two days with a positional projection and two one-dimensional players. Keeping this in mind, the rumors that owner and PR dumpster fire Stephen Ross was underwhelmed with the Dolphins' early haul is not that surprising -- or unwarranted.
4th Round, 123rd Overall: Durham Smythe, TE, Notre Dame
Remember when we talked about the repercussions involved in taking limited players? Well, the bill came due when Miami felt it necessary to cover for Gesicki's inability to block by taking arguably the draft's best blocking tight end in Smythe. If Gesicki appears to be a rich man's Jordan Thomas (an amalgam of Jordan Cameron and Julius Thomas), Smythe could be a rich man's Anthony Fasano, the fellow Notre Dame alum he's ostensibly replacing. In some quarters, Smythe was deemed to be the more well-rounded and better overall player than Gesicki, and if both players can carve out roles in two-tight end formations, there is merit to this selection. But again, with a number of surprising players still available at need positions (quarterback and defensive tackle), the 'Fins went need over best player available -- a formula that eventually costs personnel men their jobs.
4th Round, 131st Overall: Kalen Ballage, RB, Arizona State
Miami grabbed the underachieving and unpolished Ballage eight picks after Smythe, giving the Dolphins three offensive players in the first four rounds. While Ballage has undeniable potential, he's at best a third-string running back in an offense allegedly designed to spread out touches. From a scouting standpoint, my unscientific take is that my Wolfpack played Arizona State in its bowl game, and I don't remember Ballage playing (he had five touches for 22 yards). Take it for what it's worth, but when your team takes a running back in the fourth round, you'd prefer that he impacted a game you saw a few months prior. Kenyan Drake has been injury prone and inconsistent and I'm almost positive Frank Gore split carries with Edgerrin James at one point, so Ballage will have the opportunity to realize his potential. But while Gase gets his way with yet another offensive weapon, he also loses one more of the excuses that he loves to lean on.
6th Round, 209th Overall: Cornell Armstrong, DB, Southern Miss
There was some buzz around Armstrong after his selection due to his 40 time (4.39 seconds by one account), and it's fair to hold out hope that Miami found a late-round gem at a position you can never have enough of. He's a little undersized for the Dolphins' prototype, but the team got hit hard by injuries at corner a year ago, and there's always room for another corner based on the sheer number of four- and five-wide receiver sets that are in vogue. Miami has to hope that Armstrong can forge a role on special teams and develop as a down-the-road contributor in sub packages.
7th Round, 227th Overall: Quentin Poling, LB, Ohio
Poling is another undersized prospect with plus measurables, and the returns from analysts were favorable after his choice. The scouting maxim goes that you're looking for players with at least one standout quality at this stage of the draft, and Poling put up elite testing numbers at the Combine. Similar to Armstrong, Poling plays at a position of extreme need and is thought to have real potential to stick on special teams.
7th Round, 229th Overall: Jason Sanders, K, New Mexico
The conjecture is that Miami essentially gave this selection to special teams coordinator Darren Rizzi, letting him hand-pick the next Dolphins kicker. By all accounts, Rizzi scoured the country in search of a placekicker, and he chose a guy with underwhelming numbers (22 of 28 the past two years) but the highest ceiling. Many consider Rizzi to be among the league's finest special teams coaches, so I'll yield to his expertise here, at a position that Miami has struggled to solve long term.
Best-case scenario: Fitzpatrick seizes a starting role immediately, shoring up the back end, freeing up Jones to make plays around the line of scrimmage, and shifting MacDonald into a hybrid role where he finds his stride. Baker reunites with a healthy McMillan to take pressure off of Kiko Alonso and solve Miami's never-ending struggles with opposing tight ends. On offense, Gesicki and Smythe team up to overhaul the Dolphins' tight end unit, turning a weakness into a strength and boosting the team's touchdown percentage in the red zone, while Ballage emerges as a threat out of the backfield as a third-down back. In the third phase, Sanders delivers routine touchbacks and makes enough field goals to keep the 'Fins offense respectable, while one of Poling and Armstrong develops into a special teams ace. The Dolphins surprise, going 10-6 before being drilled 222-0 by the Ravens in a wildcard game.
Worst-case scenario: Fitzpatrick struggles to find his best position in the secondary while Baker becomes a liability in the run game to sap his overall confidence. Gesicki is manhandled at the line of scrimmage, Smythe can't stand out enough as a blocker to justify significant snaps, and Ballage isn't consistent enough to earn the coaches' trust and a third-down role. Armstrong and Poling don't make the team, while Sanders has difficulty adjusting to the NFL and robs the team of scoring opportunities. Tannenbaum departs (is this worst case, really?), Gase is firmly on the hot seat, and Miami "earns" a lofty draft pick in a draft devoid of top-caliber quarterback talent in 2019. Gloria Estefan gets hit by another bus, Ross is linked to the Russian NRA, and to divert attention, he names Derek Jeter coach and general manager around mid-term elections.
